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GOVERNANCE ISSUES FOR NON-PROFIT
RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS
JILL S. MANNY*

INTRODUCTION

In July 1997, a Texas jury awarded $119 million in damages
to ten former alter boys and the family of another after finding
that the Catholic Diocese of Dallas ignored evidence that a priest
was sexually abusing the boys and thereafter attempted to cover
up the scandal.1 The terms of the unprecedented judgment
mandated that not only the priest but also the diocese satisfy the
2
damage award.
This article's purpose is not to analyze the verdict's fairness.
Rather, it will attempt to shed light on the possible ramifications
of the verdict's holding, and to explore miscellaneous rules that
may impact the risk borne by dioceses. Regardless of personal
and religious sentiment engendered by the case, it seems clear
that the potential for future verdicts of the sort awarded in
Dallas could seriously jeopardize the financial stability of the
dioceses around the country.
In light of the established
precedence, dioceses must protect themselves from this sort of
verdict, both by the anticipation of similar litigation and by
effective risk planning. The most popular and perhaps the best
way to effectively reduce risk is to separately incorporate the
parishes, the dioceses, and the various organizations that
support the parishes and dioceses, such as fund-raising entities.

' Professor, New York University School of Law. J.D., Columbia University School
of Law (1982); B.A., Barnard College, Columbia University (1979). This article was
adapted from a speech delivered at the Thirty-Fourth National Meeting of Diocesan
Attorneys on April 19, 1998. I would like to thank Rob Atkinson, Professor of Law at
Florida State University, for his words of support and wisdom, Mark Chopko, Esq.,
General Counsel of the U.S. Catholic Conference for inviting me to speak at the
Conference, and John Boxer, Esq., for his research assistance.
I See Doe v. Hicks, No. 93-05258-G (Texas Dist., Dallas County., 1993).
2 See Diocese Must Pay for Priest'sAbuse of Boys, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 18, 1997, at
A12.
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If properly structured, the incorporation of each organization will
limit the liability of the individual parishes and diocese by
reducing their exposure to the actions and negligence of parish
employees, volunteers, and associated parties.
The corporations formed to protect church assets ordinarily
are non-profit corporations formed under state not-for-profit or
These corporations generally
non-profit corporation laws.
and charitable organizations
religious
qualify as tax-exempt
under federal and state laws of income taxation. 3 But these
corporations are only effective in limiting liability if the
corporations are respected as separate and distinct non-profit
corporations. 4 In circumstances where a court disregards the
corporate identity of an entity, the principals may be held liable
for corporate acts and the assets of related corporations may be
at risk to satisfy debts of other corporations. If the corporate veil
is pierced, the corporate structure is useless. 5
The article discusses the proper maintenance of these
corporations necessary to ensure that they serve their intended
purposes of limiting liability and protecting church assets. The
discussion highlights the importance of maintaining both taxexempt and non-profit corporate status and in addition identifies
the types of operations needed to protect both the organization's
tax and non-profit identities. It will also endeavor to briefly
identify and discuss various legal constraints that impact the

:3See I.R.C. §§ 501(a), 501(c)(3) (1999). Section 501(a) exempts organizations
described in section 501(c)(3) from Federal income taxation. Section 501(c)(3)
includes corporations organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of
any private shareholder or individual. See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1999). Section 1.5031(c)(3)-1(c) (1990) of the Treasury Regulations provides that an organization will be
regarded as "operated exclusively" for one or more exempt purposes if three
requirements are satisfied: (1) The organization engages primarily in activities that
accomplish exempt purposes, and no more than an insubstantial part of its
activities is in furtherance of a nonexempt purpose; (2) the net earnings of the
organization do not inure in whole or in part to the benefit of private shareholders
or individuals; and (3) the organization does not attempt to influence legislation.
4 See HARRY G. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 250-52 (1970) (disregarding
"corporateness"); ROBERTA ROMANO, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE LAW 65-75
(1993). The legal validity of an organization's corporate status allows the entity to
be treated independent of its trustees, directors, and officers for purposes of
litigation and taxation.
5 See Jane C. Schlicht, Note, Piercingthe Nonprofit Corporate Veil, 66 MARQ. L.
REV. 134, 140-50 (discussing application of Corporate Identity "Disregard Doctrine"
to nonprofit organizations).
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proper and efficient governance of religious tax-exempt
organizations.
A few caveats should be mentioned at the outset. First, the
reader should note that this article is intended to raise and
discuss briefly a variety of miscellaneous issues that impact
religious, nonprofit corporations; it does not purport to engage in
in-depth analysis of any of these issues. Second, the article
discusses non-profit corporate and tax law that impacts taxexempt organizations; it does not attempt to address issues that
arise under church law. For these purposes, the article assumes
that all of the diocesan entities and affiliated religious
organizations are exempt from federal income taxation under the
Internal Revenue Code (hereinafter the Code). 6
Religious
corporations exempt from income taxation include not only
churches but also a myriad of other tax-exempt religious entities
7
that are not treated as churches or houses of worship.
Third, the article will alert readers to issues that might
arise as a result of the formation of corporate entities for the
purpose of protecting corporate assets. The purpose of the
article is to help leaders of churches and other religious entities
think about what structures and activities might best enable
these corporations to achieve their intended purposes. Although
some of the observations might not be comforting or reassuring
and some of the restructuring suggested might be difficult to
achieve within the constraints of church tradition, history, and
law, the proposed solutions shed light on more practical and
acceptable solutions for the problems raised by recent changes in
law and structure.
One should keep in mind that the church has organized the
diocese in several forms. At times the structure has depended on
state law and at other times the structure has been dictated by
history and tradition. Of the numerous entity forms, trusts, nonprofit corporations, corporations sole, and unincorporated
6 See I.R.C. §§ 501(a), (c)(3) (1999) and the regulations thereunder.
7 See JAMES J. FISHMAN & STEPHEN ScHWARz, NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 47
(1995). Section 501(c)(3) grants tax-exemption to qualifying religious organizations
beyond the "traditional houses of worship." Id. at 427. However, only "churches,
their integrated auxiliaries and conventions or associations or churches," in the
context of religious entities, enjoy benefits beyond tax-exemption. Id. at 436.
"Churches and their integrated auxiliaries are presumed not to be private
foundations; are not required to file formal applications in order to be recognized as
tax-exempt; and they enjoy special immunities from IRS audits." Id.
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associations are the most common.8 The article directs its
observations at the proliferation of corporations formed for
purposes of protecting church assets. It addresses situations
where the diocese and the individual parishes are each
separately incorporated and situations in which other supporting
corporate entities have been formed. The supporting entities
include fundraising organizations, special interest welfare
corporations, and corporations formed to operate homeless
shelters or low-income housing projects. Although most of the
proffered comments will apply to limited liability rules or to taxexempt rules for corporations, many also apply to the other types
of entities, or at least to trusts and to unincorporated
associations.
Part II of the article discusses the two relevant bodies of
law-tax law and non-profit corporate law-and emphasizes
recent tax law changes that impose affirmative duties on the
governing boards of tax-exempt organizations. Part III outlines
the three affirmative corporate duties of loyalty, care, and
obedience imposed on corporate principals. Acknowledging the
for-profit roots of the duties, Part III examines the interplay
between non-profit corporate governance and the imposition and
influence of the three obligations. Part IV briefly identifies the
board's managerial responsibilities.
I. INCORPORATION OF THE DIOCESE

Three primary reasons exist for creating separate religious,
non-profit corporations. The first and most important reason for
restructuring is the protection of assets from creditors. A second
goal of incorporation, especially in light of the Dallas award, is to
attract donors who may be less inclined to give directly to a
church due to fear that the church's assets are vulnerable to
claims from judgment creditors. A third reason for incorporating
separate entities is to attract government grants-for example,
government contracts for low-income housing.9
In these
8 See HOWARD L. OLECK & MARTHA E. STEWART, NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS,
ORGANIZATIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS 1099-119 (6th ed. 1994) (discussing religious
organizations and various tax exempt and non-profit incorporation issue).
9 See BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-ExEMPT ORGANIZATIONS § 3.2(c), at
42 (7th ed. 1998) (stating advantages of tax-exempt status with regards to grant
awards); Allison D. Christians, Breading the Subsidy Cycle: A Proposal for
Affordable Housing, 32 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 131, 143 (1999) (describing non-

NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS

situations, the government might not be willing to make the
grant unless it can be made to a distinct non-profit corporation.
A. Non-profit Organizations:FundamentalElements
When contemplating transactions between related religious
organizations, it is imperative to analyze three distinct but
interrelated doctrines: private inurement, private benefit, and
excess benefit transactions. The private inurement and private
benefit doctrines are relatively old and established concepts and
restrictions. However, the excess benefit transactions doctrine
has arisen as an increasingly important concept due to the 1996
enactment of the Taxpayer Bill of Rights II, and Proposed
Treasury Regulations issued under that legislation in 1998.10
This new legislation imposes affirmative obligations on directors,
officers, and trustees of churches, religious organizations, and
other public charities exempt under Code section 501(c)(3) and
social welfare organizations exempt under Code section
501(c)(4). 11
a. Private Inurement
The private inurement doctrine is a broad concept.
Although it is not specifically defined in the Code or in the
Treasury Regulations, the doctrine of private inurement is
generally considered to forbid the flow of the organization's net
earnings for non-exempt purposes to those in control of the
entity, often referred to as "insiders. ' 12 The "insiders" with
profit use of Low Income Housing Tax Credit as a mechanism to generate capital for
low-income housing projects).
10 Pub. L. No. 104-168, 110 Stat. 1452 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 26 U.S.C.); Prop. Treas. Regs. §§ 53.4958-0-.4958-7, 63 Fed. Reg. 41486
(1998).
11See I.R.C. § 4958 (1999) (imposing tax on disqualified persons of 25% of
excess benefit received). "The term 'excess benefit transactions' means any
transaction in which an economic benefit is provided by an applicable tax-exempt
organization directly or indirectly to or for use of a disqualified person." I.R.C.
§ 4958(c)(1) (1999). A party is a "disqualified person" where she, in the 5-year period
ending with the transaction, was "in a position to exercise substantial influence over
the affairs of the organization." I.R.C. § 4958(f(1) (1999).
12 See I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1999) (providing that an exempt organization is one in
which "no part of the earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual"); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)-(1)(c)(2) (1990) (stating in part
that "an organization is not operated exclusively for one or more exempt purposes if
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whom the law is concerned are those individuals who have the
ability to direct the organization's resources to their private use;
in other words, those with financial control over the
organization. 13 The essence of the private inurement doctrine is
to ensure that charitable organizations serve public rather than
4
private interests.'
Functionally, the private inurement doctrine represents the
substantive dividing line between non-profit corporations and
for-profit corporations. But for the inurement principle, nonprofit and for-profit corporations are identical. Each type of
entity is created in a legal form, pays compensation to
employees, and seeks to make a profit, produce goods, and
provide services. A non-profit corporation, unlike a for-profit
one, may not distribute its profits to those who control it unless
the funds are treated as reasonable compensation or payments
for services rendered or goods sold. 15 The intended purpose of
the restraint is to ensure that the exempt organization's
resources inure to the public rather than to the private benefit of
its principals. The proscription against private inurement was,
until 1996, absolute, and violation of the prohibition, regardless
of the dollar amount, would, in theory (although often not in
6
practice), result in the loss of tax exemption.'
b. Private Benefit
A second concept, similar to private inurement, is the
private benefit limitation. The two concepts present distinct and
separate requirements for exemption.
The private benefit
its net earnings inure in whole or in part to benefit private shareholders").
13 See G.C.M. 39862 (Dec. 2, 1991); FRANCES R. HILL & BARBARA L.
KIRSCHTEN,
FEDERAL AND STATE TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS
T 2.03[3][c], at 2-85 (1998) (addressing the modem application of inurement
doctrine).
14 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 200-27.
15 See I.R.C. §162(a)(1) (1999); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-4(b)(3)(i)(ii), 63 Fed.
Reg. 41486 (1998) (defining reasonable compensation); see also Henry Hansmann,
The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise,89 YALE L.J. 835, 838-40 (1980) (noting nonprofits
ability to pay reasonable compensation); HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 13,
3.07[1] [a], at 3-60 (reviewing reasonableness of compensation paid to physicians in
non-profit entities and issues arising therefrom); FISHMAN & SCHWARZ,
supra note 7.
16 See I.R.C. § 4958 (1999) and regulations thereunder (substituting
intermediate penalty for loss of exempt status).
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restriction prohibits the receipt of anything more than incidental
private benefits by an individual or entity other than an
intended beneficiary of the organization, and other than as
reasonable compensation for goods or services. 17 Unlike private
inurement, the test for private benefit is not absolute. Any
inurement, at least before 1996, would (in theory, but not in
practice) result in loss of tax-exempt status. In order for an
organization to lose its exempt status under the private benefit
doctrine, the private benefits improperly received must be
quantitatively and qualitatively more than incidental. 8
Furthermore, unlike the inurement doctrine and the excess
benefit doctrine, the private benefit concept operates as to both
"insider" and "outsider" private benefit recipients. 19
It is possible that the private benefit doctrine may be raised
in transactions between parishes, where one parish might
receive a substantial benefit from another in a non-arm's length
transaction.
A financially significant transaction between
parishes where, for example, a parcel of land is sold well below
its fair market value, could give rise to private benefit issues
that might jeopardize the tax-exempt status of the seller. The
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) might attack the transaction as
one in which the intended beneficiaries (the parish and
parishioners of the selling parish) are not benefiting from the
transaction, because the parish and parishioners of the
purchasing parish are improperly receiving a private benefit in
the form of a bargain sale. 20 In any event, directors approving a
bargain sale of land to a related parish might very well violate
17 See American Campaign Academy v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 1053, 1075-77
(1989) (denying tax-exemption because secondary benefit was not incidental and
was more than a substantial part of Academy's activities); G.C.M. 39862
("determining whether a benefit flowing to private individuals evidences a
substantial non-charitable purpose requires balancing of qualitative and
quantitative benefits").
18 See HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 13, at $ 2.0312] (discussing Service's
position on and definition of "incidental" benefits); HOPKINS, supra note 9, at 463
(providing illustration of incidental benefit).
19 See American Campaign Academy, 92 T.C. at 1069 (noting that private
benefit prohibition extends to "disinterested persons"); G.C.M. 39862 (Dec. 2, 1991).
20 Although this analysis might be difficult to sustain, it is one of the few
avenues for revoking the exemption of the first parish available to the Internal
Revenue Service, particularly in light of the Seventh Circuit decision in the United
Cancer Council case, which seems to leave authority to penalize the charity and its
directors to the states in this situation. See United Cancer Council v. Commissioner,
165 F.3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1999), rev'g and remand'g 109 T.C. 326 (1997).
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the duties of care and loyalty, and might be subject to sanctions
at the state level. 2 1 Accordingly, non-arm's length transactions
between diocese, parishes, and affiliated organizations should be
avoided.
c. Excess Benefit Transactions
The enactment of Code section 4958 under the 1996
Taxpayer's Bill of Rights II and the release of Proposed Treasury
Regulations under that Code section has been one of the most
important developments in the law of tax-exempt organizations.
Code section 4958 provides an intermediate sanction, which
replaces, in most cases involving public charities, the ultimate
sanction of revocation of tax-exempt status for private
inurement.
Until the enactment of section 4958, the only
sanction for private inurement was the loss of tax exemption. In
fact, both the IRS and the courts viewed the penalty as so severe,
that in many cases, it was not applied, and inurement went
unpunished. 22
The court's uneasiness with imposing the
ultimate sanction of the private inurement doctrine is evident in
the United Way's ability to retain its tax-exemption not
23
withstanding Bill Aramony's well-publicized follies.
Section 4958 imposes a penalty excise tax as an
intermediate sanction on section 501(c)(3) public charities (nonprivate foundations) and on section 501(c)(4) social welfare
organizations engaging in certain specified impermissible
transactions. 24 Although the primary sanction for inurement in
public charities will be the section 4958 tax, the ultimate
sanction of revocation of a charity's tax-exempt status is still
25
available for the most egregious cases of inurement.
In an excess benefit transaction, Code section 4958

See infra Part III and accompanying notes.
See Consuelo Lauda Kertz, Executive Compensation Dilemmas in TaxExempt Organizations:Reasonableness, Comparability and Disclosure, 71 TUL. L.
REV. 819, 828 (1997) (providing examples of IRS's reluctance to impose ultimate
sanction).
23 See Aramony v. United Way of America, 28 F. Supp. 2d 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(setting forth CEO and president William Aramony's fraudulent management of the
United Way of America).
24 See I.R.C. § 4958(e)(1) (1999); Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4958-2(b)(c), 63 Fed.
21

22

Reg.41486 (1998).
25

See HILL & KIRSCHTEN, supra note 13, at $ 2.03 [31 ff.
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mandates that tax sanctions be imposed on "disqualified
persons," similar to "insiders" under the inurement concept, who
improperly benefit from the transaction. 26 Of significance is
section 4958's broad definition of "disqualified person," which
encompasses organization managers, such as officers, directors
and trustees, highly compensated individuals, and others with
"substantial influence" (or substantial financial control) over all
or a significant portion of the organization's affairs. 27 While
section 4958(a)(1) imposes a penalty excise tax on the
disqualified person receiving the excess benefit, section
4958(a)(2) sanctions organization managers who knowingly
approved the improper transaction.
Excess benefit transactions subject to the excise tax include
one of two situations: (1) where a disqualified person receives
unreasonable compensation or engages in a non-fair market
value transaction with the organization 28 or (2) where an
organization compensates a disqualified person based, in whole
or in part, on the organization's income from the transaction (i.e.,
where there is a joint-venture type of financial arrangement
between an organization and a disqualified person). 29 The
Proposed Treasury Regulations mentioned above clarify many of
the issues surrounding the first type of excess benefit
transaction. But leave most of the questions surrounding the
second type of excess benefit transaction unanswered. Final
Treasury Regulations to be issued in the near future will
hopefully shed light on the distinction between permissible and
improper revenue-based compensation arrangements under
Code section 4958.
The amount of the first tier excise tax imposed on a
disqualified person is 25% of the excess benefit. 30 Where the
disqualified person does not return the excess benefit to the
26 See I.R.C. §§ 4958(a)(1) (1999); id. at (f)(1) (defining "disqualified person");
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-3, 63 Fed. Reg. 41486 (1998).
27 See I.R.C. §§ 4958(a)(2) (1999); id. at (f)(2) (defining "organization manager");
Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4958-1(d)(1), (2), 63 Fed. Reg. 41486 (1998).
27 See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4958-1(d)(1), (2), (3), 63 Fed. Reg. 41486 (1998); see
also J. Eric Taylor, Intermediate Sanctions Under § 4958: An Overview of the
Proposed Regulations, 73 FLA B.J. 73, 74 (1999) (explaining "reasonable"
compensation).
29 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-5, 63 Fed. Reg. 41486 (1998); see also Taylor,
supra note 27, at 75 (explaining revenue sharing transactions).
30See I.R.C. § 4958(a)(1) (1999) (stating in part: "there is hereby imposed on
each excess benefit transaction a tax equal to 25% of the excess benefit").
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exempt-corporation in a timely manner, section 4958(b) imposes
a second level of tax equal to 200% of the excess benefit
received. 3 1 The tax sanction imposed on an organization
manager is equal to 10% of the excess benefit. 32 The tax on
mangers is capped at $10,000,33 which seems to be an aggregate
cap for tax on all liable managers (with all managers being
jointly and severally liable for the total amount of the tax
34
imposed on mangers).
For dioceses, what may be most significant is obtaining the
advantage of a presumption of reasonableness that shifts the
burden of proof of reasonableness to the IRS. There is a
rebuttable presumption of reasonableness with respect to
compensation and a similar presumption with respect to
valuation if the arrangement is approved by a board or a
committee thereof composed entirely of individuals unrelated to
35
and not subject to the control of the disqualified person.
To take advantage of the rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness, the board or committee should obtain and rely
upon appropriate data comparing the salaries of comparable
positions in the non-profit and for-profit arenas. The board or
committee should also provide adequate documentation for the
basis of the determination of reasonableness.
As to the dioceses and their related organizations, there are
several aspects of the excess benefit transactions provision that
may be relevant to their operations. First, the statute places an
affirmative duty on the boards of charitable organizations as
defined under section 501(c)(3), including churches and religious
organizations, to determine reasonableness of compensation for
disqualified persons through comparability studies and to
properly document the basis for each determination. 36 If the
31 See I.R.C. § 4958(b) (1999) (stating in part: "in an case in which an initial tax
is imposed by subsection (a)(1) on an excess benefit transaction and the excess
benefit involved in such transaction is not corrected within the taxable period, there
is hereby imposed a tax equal to 200 percent of the excess benefit involved"); Prop.
Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4958-1(c)(2)(ii), (iii), 63 Fed. Reg. 41486 (1998) (outlining
necessary methods to correct excess benefit transactions within a timely manner).
32 See I.R.C. § 4958(a)(2) (1999).
33 See I.R.C. § 4958(d)(2) (1999) (stating "with respect to any 1 excess benefit
transaction, the maximum amount of tax imposed by subsection (a)(2) shall not
exceed $10,000").
34 See I.R.C. § 4958(d)(1) (1999).
35 See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 53.4958-6, 63 Fed. Reg. 41486 (1998).
36 See Prop. Treas. Reg. §53.4958-6(d)(3), 63 Fed. Reg. 41486 (1998).
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board follows these procedures, it can take advantage of the
rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden of proof of
"reasonableness" to the IRS. Second, the statute penalizes board
members (by imposing excise taxes) for failing to properly
execute their duty to set reasonable compensation levels. This
should send a warning to the dioceses. Third, Proposed Treasury
Regulations state that, in order to shift the burden of proof to the
IRS, all compensation or valuation decisions with respect to a
disqualified person must be made by a board of directors or
committee of the board that is "composed entirely of individuals
who do not have a conflict of interest with respect to the
arrangement of the transaction."37 This provision requires that
the board consist of some members who are not related to the
disqualified person and not controlled by the disqualified person
so that an independent committee can be formed to make
Fortunately, the
compensation and valuation judgments.
Proposed Regulations permit the board to delegate decisions
surrounding compensation of disqualified persons to a committee
composed entirely of individuals who do not have a conflict of
interest, including "other parties" (presumably non-board
members), provided that the delegation is permitted under the
relevant state law.38 In the event that structuring an impartial

board is impossible in certain cases, this provision may be
particularly useful to dioceses and their related corporations
wishing to take advantage of the rebuttable presumption.
The issue becomes more complicated when dealing with
parishes. Under church law and certain state law, 39 it may be

impossible to structure an impartial or an independent board
with respect to parishes. 40 It might be possible, however, to
structure an independent board (or at least a committee of a

37

Prop. Treas. Reg. §53.4958-6(a)(1), 63 Fed. Reg. 41486 (1998).

38 See Prop. Treas. Reg. §53.4958-6(b), 63 Fed. Reg. 41486 (1998).
39 See, e.g., N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW (McKinney 1990) (promulgating the laws
for organization of denominational churches).
40 See id. 91
91 (describing the "[glovernment of Roman Catholic churches"); see
also Filetto v. St. Mary of the Assumption Church, 305 N.Y.S. 2d. 403, 407 (Sup. Ct.
1969) (discussing composition of parish boards and parishioner's lack of input with
respect to naming board members).
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board or of "other parties," when permitted under state law), for
independent organizations such as fundraising entities. 4 1 Under
many state laws, creating an independent board could be
accomplished for most diocesan corporations.
Consider a
hypothetical scenario in which the chief executive officer of a
fundraising entity is a bishop. If a diocesan administrator and a
pastor on the board of the fundraising entity participate in
setting the bishop's salary, the rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness would be forfeited.
In this hypothetical,
therefore, it would be desirable to restructure the board or the
compensation committee to include some independent members,
like parishioners. In doing so, salaries could be set without
jeopardizing the favorable presumption that shifts the burden of
proof to the IRS.

II. NON-PROFIT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
It is important that religious corporations formed for the
primary purpose of protecting church assets adhere to basic
corporate rules regarding operations and independence in order
to maintain the advantages of limited liability.
The directors of a non-profit corporation are charged with
managing the affairs of the organization. This responsibility,
with respect to trustees and directors (hereinafter used
interchangeably), can be separated into three fiduciary duties:
the duty of loyalty; the duty of care; and the duty of obedience. 42
The first two duties are derived from the for-profit world while
the third is unique to non-profit entities. 43

41 See N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW $ 91.
42 See Note, The Fiduciary Duties of Loyalty and Care Associated with the
Directors and Trustees of Charitable Organizations, 64 VA. L. REV. 449 (1978)

(discussing fiduciary duties of non-profit corporate fiduciaries); DANIEL L. KURTZ,
BOARD LIABILITY: GUIDE TO NONPROFIT DIRECTORS 21-22 (1988) (noting legal
standards by which directors are judged); HOWARD L. OLECK, NONPROFIT
CORPORATIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND ASSOCIATIONS § 263 (5th ed. 1988).
43 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 200; see also VICTORIA B.
BJORKLUND

ET.

AL.,

NEW

ANALYSIS 413-15 (1997).

YORK NONPROFIT

LAW

AND PRACTICE: WITH

TAX
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A. Affirmative Duties
a. Duty of Loyalty
The board of directors' duty of loyalty mandates that a
46
director act in a manner that is not harmful to the corporation.
It also requires directors to avoid using their positions
improperly to obtain personal benefits or advantages that might
more properly belong to the corporation. 45 In other words,
usurping a corporate opportunity or using non-disseminated,
nonpublic information to produce financial windfalls for a
director would violate the duty of loyalty. 46 In furtherance of the
concept of "undivided" loyalty, the duty requires objective
decision making. 47 The duty of loyalty is violated when conflicts
48
of interest influence the decisions of directors.
In reality, the most significant considerations in satisfying
the duty of loyalty are, in hindsight, whether a particular
decision was fair to the organization when it was made, and
whether the decision was reached or approved by an impartial
board. 49 The existence of overlapping boards increases the
difficulty of achieving an impartial board environment,
particularly where the overlap is significant and the entities
50
with overlapping boards engage in transactions together.
Expanding and diversifying boards and eliminating or reducing
the overlap will greatly improve an organization's chances of
achieving an impartial board environment, engaging in fair
44 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 200.
45 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 200 (stating that duty of
obedience requires that directors adhere to mission or organization).
46 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 201-14 (providing personal
benefit transaction examples).
47 See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 393.
48 See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 393-94; Bennet B. Harvey, The PublicSpirited Defendant and Others: Liability of Directors and Officers of Not-For-Profit
Organizations, 17 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 665, 681 (discussing the standards of care
and liability applicable to directors of non-profit organizations). It is not necessarily
fatal to the transaction or director when conflicts of interest arise. See id. at 681-82.
While the courts subject self-interested transactions to considerable scrutiny, the
Model Business Corporations Act provides a limited window for such deals. See id.
at 682; see also FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 202 (providing reasons for
allowing limited interested transactions).
49 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 203.
s0 See Harvey, supra note 48, at 705-07 (examining case law dealing with the
issue of board member who is on both for-profit and not for-profit corporation).
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transactions, and upholding the duty of loyalty.
It is difficult for a director to properly exercise the duty of
loyalty to a corporation when a conflict of interest exists.
Serving on boards of several organizations that interact with one
another can create such a conflict. This is perhaps the most
significant issue for the new structures of diocesan corporations.
For example, assume a diocese has separately incorporated
parishes. In each parish in the diocese, the board of directors or
trustees consists of the bishop, the vicar general (or other
diocesan administrator), and the pastor of the parish. Thus in
each parish in the diocese, two of three directors are identicalthe administrator and the bishop, and these two directors
generally exercise significant control over the third member of
the board. Those same two individuals serve on the board of the
diocese. The responsibilities of the bishop and the diocesan
administrator would be the same with respect to each parish. It
is easy to see the problems created by this structure. It would be
difficult, if not impossible, for each of these boards to operate at
arm's length with one another and with the diocese. To have a
separate corporation respected for corporate purposes, these
entities must operate as distinct entities involved in arm's length
transactions.
Failure to attain a separate corporate identity increases the
likelihood that a court will pierce the corporate veil under
appropriate circumstances.5 1 In the case of a large judgement
against a parish or diocese such as the Dallas judgement
mentioned above, piercing the corporate veil may result in the
loss of parish assets and assets of the diocese itself. In addition,
the trustees and directors risk personal liability.5 2 This might
excite an attorney general or a disgruntled and litigious
individual, but it should engender fear in all of those charged
with managing religious organizations
structured with
overlapping boards of this type.
The problems of overlapping boards may be demonstrated
when a fundraising corporation is created separate from the
diocese and parishes for the primary purpose of soliciting and
protecting donations and assuring potential benefactors that
51 See Schlicht, supra note 5, at 140-43 (defining disregard doctrine and

examining traditional situations in which court has pierced corporate veil).
52 See Schlicht, supra note 5, at 143-44 (imposing personal liability on
members of non-profit where court disregards corporateness).
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assets will not be used to satisfy legal fees or damage awards in
misconduct cases. The sole function of the fundraising entity is
to solicit funds, make grants to the diocese and the parishes, and
to expend funds on their behalf. Furthermore, the board of each
entity (the fundraising entity, the diocese, and each parish),
consists of two of the same three members - the bishop and the
diocesan administrator. When faced with an issue, a court might
question whether each of the entities has a distinct corporate
existence, and whether transactions between the entities can be
considered to be at arm's length. After all, precisely the same
people who control the grant recipients control the grant maker.
If a court concludes that the independent identity of each entity
is illusive and that the separateness is a sham, it is more likely,
when petitioned by a judgment creditor, to pierce the corporate
veil of each organization, enabling the creditor to reach the
assets of all of the allegedly separate entities. 53 Under this
scenario, the assets of the fundraising entity might end up in the
hands of the creditors of any parish or diocese.
A significant protection against violation of the duty of
loyalty is the regulation of conflict of interest transactions.
Directors who operate in their own self-interests violate their
Accordingly, the religious
undivided duty of loyalty.
organizations at issue should take several steps to ensure that a
conflict of interest does not result in the loss of distinct corporate
status for one or more of the entities involved.
First and foremost, each entity should adopt a conflict of
outlining acceptable and unacceptable
interest policy
relationships among the organization, its board members and,
where relevant, its staff.5 4 The policy should require all
transactions, including those within an organization, as well as
those between parishes, between the parish and the diocese, and
between a parish or the diocese and a supporting organization, to
53 See Schlicht, supra note 5, at 140-42.
54 See DAVID B. RIGNEY, CONFLICT OF INTEREST POLICIES AND PROCEDURES
FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, IN NONPROFIT GOVERNANCE: THE EXECUTIVE'S
GUIDE 111 (Victor Futter & George W. Overton eds., 1997) (stating traditional

remedy for conflict of interest situations are "disclosure and nonparticipation by
officer or director in any formal decision concerning a transaction in which he or she

may have a conflicting interest"). The conflict of interest policy should specify the
following: (1) individuals covered; (2) the scope of activities and relationships
covered; and (3) the standard and procedures to follow for any transaction within
the scope specified. See id. at 112-13.
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be approved by a vote of disinterested, or non-conflicted
directors-unless state law prohibits such approval. 55 Interested
directors should abstain so as not to taint the transaction. For
example, a vote of disinterested directors should be required to
approve a grant from a fundraising organization to a related
parish or diocese. Otherwise, the entity invites an attack on the
grant or transaction by disgruntled litigants or creditors. 56 For
this purpose, a director who sits on the board of more than one
entity involved in the transaction could be considered interested
with respect to the transaction.
The second step that an organization should take to avoid
conflicts of interest is to restructure the board in a way that
makes arm's length transactions possible.5 7 Using the above
example, a diocese may accomplish a disinterested structure if
the bishop and diocesan administrator serve only on the board of
the diocese and not on the boards of the individual parishes.
Each parish board would consist of the pastor and three or four
parishioners. Under this scenario, each parish would operate,
from a corporate structure perspective, independently of one
another and of the diocese. The bishop, as well as several
community members, could serve on the board of related
fundraising entities. In an effort to retain the independence of
the community members, they might be appointed by their
respective pastors rather than by the bishop. This structure may
not be feasible in all situations, but other methods may be
available to avoid conflicts of interest and to protect the assets of
the organizations. For example, the boards could be expanded so
that the interested directors do not constitute the majority. If
each parish had a board consisting of the bishop, the vicar
general, the pastor and three parishioners, a majority of the
directors or trustees would not overlap.

55 See, e.g., N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 5 (McKinney 1997) (prohibiting certain

churches from transferring property without archbishop's or bishop's consent).
56 See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 393-413. Fairness is the fundamental

purpose for disclosing the existence of a conflict and for mandating a disinterested
vote. See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 395. Where litigants question the validity of
a transaction due to the absence of adequate disclosure or disinterested vote the
parties to the transaction must prove that the transaction was fair to the
corporation. See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 404-05.
57 See KURTZ, supra note 42, at 5-7 (describing composition and nature of
board).
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Another structuring possibility available to eliminate
conflicts of interest is to adopt a policy that permits only
disinterested directors to vote. Under this policy, the bishop and
the diocesan administrator would abstain from any vote
involving a transaction with another entity for which they serve
as directors. This would further help to ensure, for corporate law
purposes, that the separate existence of each diocesan
corporation would be respected. Again, as is the case under the
New York Religious Corporations Law,5 8 this kind of
restructuring might not be feasible. It is necessary, however, to
create a structure in which a majority of the voting directors are
not interested in the transaction.5 9 For corporate law purposes,
a separate, independent identity must be established for each
entity. Nevertheless, it is apparent that the boards of religious
non-profit corporations should expand and diversify in order to
take advantage of the purposes and benefits that they were
intended to provide. Ultimately, restructuring may be crucial to
the protection of the assets of parishes and dioceses.
A third step in maintaining distinct legal entities is to
respect what will be termed "corporate niceties." This involves
proper corporate maintenance achieved by following the
requirements of state law.6 0 A non-profit religious organization
should properly draft certificates or articles of incorporation and
by-laws; maintain adequate records required under state and
federal law; file properly prepared and reviewed annual reports;
hold regular board meetings; and draft, review and approve
minutes of those meetings. 61 Furthermore, financial statements
of the organization should be reviewed and approved by all
officers and directors. 62 These items provide the necessary paper
58 See N.Y. RELIG. CORP. LAW § 5 (McKinney 1997) (requiring transfers of
property be approved by archbishop or bishop).
59 See N.Y. NOT-FOR-PROFIT CORP. LAW § 708 (McKinney 1997); see also
WILLIAM E. KNEPPER & DAN A. BAILEY, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND

DIRECTORS §4-5, at 137 (5th. ed. 1993) (stating that Model Business Corporations
Act requires that "interested directors... abstain, and approval by disinterested
directors, is requisite when inchoate conflicts become choate").
60 See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 415 (noting that in addition to three
duties nonprofit directors must act within confines of state law and purpose of
organization).
61 See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 219-29.
62 See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 331 (noting that the board is responsible
for periodic review of financial statements and that some functions of board include
establishing operating procedures, budgets, projections and fiscal controls).
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trail to legitimize the organization's corporate existence in those
situations where it is challenged.
Aside from the threat that the corporate veil will be pierced,
there are other reasons for maintaining separate corporate
First, as
existence and for avoiding conflicts of interest.
discussed in more detail in relation to the duty of care, avoiding
conflicts protects the judgment of directors and trustees from
attack. This is particularly true when corporate decisions have
less than favorable results. 63 The business judgment rule shields
directors in such situations but it only applies to a director who
has made an informed decision in good faith, without a disabling
conflict of interest. 64 In the scenario, the business judgment rule
can be a valuable source of protection for the decisions of
directors.
Second, avoiding conflicts of interest decreases the
possibility that a transaction will be set aside or rescinded. 65 For
example, if the sale of land between parishes is determined by
overlapping boards, or if a director sitting on the boards of both
the purchasing and the selling corporation has made the decision
as to sale and price, the validity of the sale could be challenged.
If the circumstances indicate that the sale was not negotiated at
arm's length, a court could set aside the sale. Realistically, if the
purchase price is equal to the fair market value, a challenge is
unlikely. The fact that conflicted directors vote on a transaction
does create a sense of impropriety that could be detrimental
66
should the transaction be challenged.
Third, avoiding conflicts of interest through the creation of a
diverse and independent board will enable exempt religious
organizations to take advantage of the rebuttable presumption
63 See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 382 (describing business judgment rule).
The business judgment rule "provides that judgments by boards about 'business'
matters are presumptively correct and that boards function best when these

decisions remain beyond judicial scrutiny except in cases of egregious misconduct."
Id.
64 See id.
65 See GREGORY V. VERALLO & DANIEL A. DREISBACH, FUNDAMENTALS OF

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 102 (1996) (stating that transactions entered into with a
conflict of interest "will be sustained only if it is objectively and intrinsically fair");
see also GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS OF NONPROFIT CORPORATIONS 31 (George
Overton ed., 1993) [hereinafter GUIDEBOOK FOR DIRECTORS] (noting that board
must reexamine a transaction after it discovers the proposal was acted upon in
ignorance of an undisclosed interest).
66 See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 403-04.
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set forth in section 4958 of the Code. 67The presumption shifts the
burden of proof from the organization to the IRS. Therefore,
conflicts of interest should be avoided, in spite of competing
concerns that might arise under the structure of church law.
Diversification and expansion are key words that should be kept
in mind when determining strategies for avoiding conflicts of
interest.
b. Duty of Care
In addition to the fiduciary duty of loyalty, directors are held
to a certain degree of care. The duty of care relates to a
director's decision-making process, and to the standard of
conduct applicable to directors in the discharge of their
obligations and responsibilities with respect to non-profit
organizations.
Directors must discharge their corporate
responsibilities "in good faith, and with a certain degree of
diligence, attention, care and skill."68 If a director acts within
these parameters, the court will not review the director's action
even if it proves disastrous to the organization, as long as there
69
was no fraud, illegality or disabling conflict of interest.
Effectively, if the directors exercise their best judgment, they are
protected by the best judgment rule, which is a corollary to the
business judgment rule used in the for-profit corporate world. In
other words, the "duty of care focuses on the manner in which
directors exercise their responsibilities rather than on the
correctness of a decision."7 0 As long as directors remain alert,
make informed decisions, and actively supervise corporate
operations, they are not likely to violate the duty of care.
The duty of care provides another compelling reason to
maintain a diverse and independent board in dioceses and their
affiliated entities. To gain the protection of the business
judgment rule, directors must abstain from voting when they
have a conflict of interest. 71 Thus, an official on the board of a
fundraising entity in a diocese who votes to make a grant or to
67 See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.

68 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 161.
69 See id.
70 Id.

71 See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 394-96; see also GUIDEBOOK FOR
DIRECTORS, supra note 65, at 30-31.
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sell property to a parish on whose board the official also serves,
may not be protected by the business judgment rule should the
grant or sale be challenged. Overlapping boards further increase
the risk that the overlapping board members will lose the
protection of the business judgment rule.
c. Duty of Obedience
To complete the discussion of the fiduciary duties of nonprofit board members, it is necessary to discuss the duty of
obedience. 72 There is some question as to whether this duty
actually exists as a separate duty, or whether it is best described
as an element of the duty of loyalty and the duty of care as
applied to non-profit organizations. It is a rather nebulous duty
to carry out the mission of the organization. The duty of
obedience essentially prohibits directors from "deviat[ing] in any
substantial way from their duty to fulfill the particular purpose
for which the organization was created," unless, the particular
73
deviation is permitted by law.
For diocesan organizations, issues concerning the duty of
obedience primarily arise with respect to the prohibition against
private inurement and private benefit found in the tax rules
discussed earlier. 74 The duty of obedience requires that the
board operate an organization for public, exempt and charitable
purposes, rather than for private purposes. Any time that a
conflict of interest arises between a board member and the
organization, there is a danger that private purposes will be
served.
This is yet another motivation for maintaining
independent boards with some diversity in membership.
Diversity enables those with conflicts of interest to abstain from
votes that might cause a violation of the duty of obedience.
Obeying the fiduciary duties of loyalty, care, and obedience
is paramount to maintaining diocesan organizations that are
respected as corporations. Officers and directors of diocesan
corporations must keep these duties in mind when acting on
72 See, e.g., FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 227-29; BJORKLUND, supra
note 43, at 413-14. The duty of obedience requires the board to administer the
entity in a manner that ensures that the mission and purpose of the organization is
carried out. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 227.
73 FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 228.
74 See supra notes 12-21 and accompanying text.
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behalf of non-profit corporations. Failure to fulfill these duties
could result in the piercing of corporate veils and a failure of the
organizations to serve the very purposes for which they were
formed.
III. MANAGERIAL TASKS: FURTHERING THE ORGANIZATION'S
MISSION

A board's responsibility to manage the affairs of the
corporation can be subdivided into many different tasks. While
there are far too many to identify and discuss, the final section of
the article highlights several of the more important
responsibilities.
The fundamental responsibility of the non-profit board is to
identify and define the organization's mission. Ideally, the
organization should draft and distribute a mission statement to
guide both the organization in its activities and the board in its
decisions.
A second board responsibility important in achieving and
furthering the organization's mission is the selection of officers,
particularly the Chief Executive Officer.75 This applies less to
parishes and more to the other types of supporting entities now
being created. Setting salaries is another important function of
the board. As discussed above, salaries should be set only after
conducting proper comparability studies. 76 Under the tax law, a
board's failure to properly set salaries can lead to the imposition
77
of penalty excise taxes on both officers and directors.
A third managerial task of directors is to be intimately
involved in the strategic planning of the organization.7 8 When
75 See WILLIAM G. BOWEN, INSIDE THE BOARDROOM 47-51 (1994); see e.g.,
BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 330. The board of directors of non-profit
organizations play a significant role, even more so then in for-profit entities. See
BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 330. Unlike for profit principals, officers of nonprofits operate out from under the watchful eye of shareholders and wield broad
managerial discretion. Tempered only by the organization's mission, the selection of
non-profit principals becomes a distinct and important responsibility.
76 See supra notes 30-36 and accompanying text.
77 See I.R.C. § 4958 (1999); Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 53.4958-1(d)(1), (2), (3), 63 Fed.
Reg. 41486 (1998).
78 See BJORKLUJND, supra note 43, at 331 (noting that some of the board's
internal functions involve "approving long range plans involving, for example, new
program initiatives or major modifications of existing programs, resource
acquisition, or disposition and new revenue-generating measures. .. ).
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board members are selected for expertise, vision, commitment,
empathy, and experience, rather than for other reasons, they can
contribute in a meaningful and decisive way to the organization's
79
planning and to the achievement of its mission.
Fourth, directors should review and approve the
organization's financial statements.80 Board members must
consider financial oversight in a non-profit organization to be a
top priority in order to ensure that the organization will have
sufficient resources to accomplish its mission. Board members
should be willing and able to review and understand financial
statements. Unfortunately, however, this is too often not the
case.8 ' An organization should consider the responsibilities of its
directors and should take the steps necessary to ensure that
board members are comfortable and capable in a financial
82
oversight role.

Finally, boards should ensure that the organization's
endowment is properly invested by individuals who are
competent to make investment decisions.8 3 For example, when
selecting board members for a diocesan fundraising entity, it
would be wise to select one or two individuals with expertise in
investing endowments, or at least with sufficient knowledge to
enable them to work effectively with investment advisors to
maximize the entity's endowment.
CONCLUSION

It is important to emphasize that some of the issues
addressed in this article are difficult to resolve in the context of
diocesan corporations, affiliated parishes, and supporting
Church law, history, and tradition must be
corporations.
respected in the operation of these corporations. This article's
79 See BOWEN, supra note 75, at 51-52.
80 See BJORKLUND, supra note 43, at 331.
81 See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 877 (Del. 1985) (reasoning that
the directors' decision was not informed due in part to the fact that they never
questioned the Chief Financial Officer and failed to consult with experts).
82 One helpful resource is UnderstandingNon-Profit FinancialStatements-A
Primerfor Board Members, published by the National Center for Nonprofit Boards.
83 See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ, supra note 7, at 229. Upon delegating investment
responsibilities to outside sources, the board maintains the responsibility to review
and approve investment strategies and mechanisms. See FISHMAN & SCHWARZ,
supra note 7, at 229.
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purpose is to convey, in light of the Dallas verdict, that forming
separate corporations to protect diocesan assets is extremely
useful. These organizations, however, may not achieve their
intended purposes unless they are operated as true non-profit,
tax-exempt entities. In other words, the organizations must
adhere to state corporate laws as well as to state and federal tax
laws, in addition to church law, in order to take advantage of the
protection that civil laws provide.
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